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Abstract This paper studies two-player zero-sum stochastic Bayesian games where
each player has its own dynamic state that is unknown to the other player. Using
typical techniques, we provide the recursive formulas and the sufficient statistics
in both the primal game and its dual games. It’s also shown that with a specific
initial parameter, the optimal strategy of one player in a dual game is also the
optimal strategy of the player in the primal game. We, then, construct linear pro-
grams to compute the optimal strategies in both the primal game and the dual
games and the special initial parameters in the dual games. The main results are
demonstrated in a security problem of underwater sensor networks.
Keywords Game theory · Stochastic · LP · Zero-sum · Dual game
1 Introduction
Because of the multi-agent nature, game theory has great potential in solving or
explaining economic, social, and engineering problems. Game theory has been used
in addressing AdWord problems [2], enhancing the security of Los Angeles airport
[12], advising in presidential election and nuclear disarmament [1, 6], explaining
and anticipating disease spreading [5], and many other problems. One common
property of these problems is that the individuals or agents in the problems have
their own private information not shared with the others. For example, didders in
AdWord problems may not reveal its budget to the other bidders.
If one or more agents in a game don’t have complete information about the
game, we call the game a game with incomplete information, which was first intro-
duced in [11]. In this case, a player in the game makes its strategy according to its
observations like the other players’ actions and/or its own payoff. Two-player zero-
sum games with incomplete information are special cases of games with incomplete
information, and the focus of this paper.
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This paper studies two player zero-sum stochastic games with incomplete in-
formation on both sides, which are also called stochastic Bayesian games. In these
games, both players have their own types (private information) which will change
stage by stage, and the payoffs depend on both players’ types. We assume that
both players can observe the actions of each other, and the one-stage payoffs won’t
be revealed until the end of the game.
Compared with the previous work in [1, 3, 13, 15, 19], our model considers the
stochastic property of both players’ types and the incomplete information on both
sides. [1,3,7,8,10,18,22] considered repeated games with incomplete information in
which every player’s type is fixed at the beginning of the game, while [13,15,16,19]
studied games with incomplete information from one side.
Our main results in Section 3 and 4 are closely related to [15]. In [15], every
player’s type is fixed, and a public stochastic state is considered. Compared with
[15], our model doesn’t have the public stochastic state, and the players’ types
change stage by stage. Considering the model differences, it is necessary to develop
the corresponding results though the techniques are typical and frequently used
in the prior work [3, 13–15,18]. We develop a recursive formula in primal game to
compute the game value and show that the pair of believes of both players’ types is
a sufficient statistic of the players. This sufficient statistic depends on both players’
strategies, and hence neither player has full access to it. To address this problem,
we study dual games of the two player zero-sum stochastic Bayesian game. The
relationships between the game values of the primal game and the dual games
are provided. Moreover, we show that with some special initial parameters, the
optimal strategy of one player in the corresponding dual game is also its optimal
strategy in the primal game, and this optimal strategy only relies on the belief
of its own type and the realized vector payoff of the other player’s type. In other
words, the belief of its own type and the realized vector payoff of the other player’s
type is the player’s sufficient statistic in the dual game. Different from the believes
of both players’ types, the sufficient statistic in the dual game is fully accessible
by the player.
We, then, further propose LP formulations to compute the special initial pa-
rameters in the dual games, and the optimal strategies in both the primal game
and the dual games, which is closely related to [21]. Previous work in [21] intro-
duced the sequence form to develop an LP formulation to compute the optimal
strategies in primal games. Compared with [21], we use the recursive formula of
vector payoff to develop the LP formulation for the primal game. Moreover, we
extend the results to dual games, and figure out how to compute the special initial
parameters in the dual game, which was not discussed in [21]. The main results
are demonstrated in a jamming problem in underwater acoustic sensor networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the game
model. Primal game value and its recursive formula are computed in section 3.
Section 4 describes the dual game and its recursive form. The strategies of players
both in primal and dual game are computed with linear programming in section 5.
In section 6 we apply the computed optimal strategies of players in an underwater
acoustic sensor network jamming problem and show that for specific initial vector
payoff, the optimal strategy of the dual game is also the optimal strategy in the
primal game.
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2 Problem setup
Let Rn denote the n-dimensional real space, and K be a finite set. The cardinality
of K and the set of probability distribution over K is denoted by |K| and ∆(K),
respectively. A two player zero sum stochastic game with incomplete information
on both sides is specified by the nine-tuple (K,L,A,B, p, q, P,Q,G), where
– K and L are non-empty finite sets, called player 1 and 2’s state sets, respec-
tively.
– A and B are non-empty finite sets, called player 1 and 2’s action sets, re-
spectively where at ∈ A and bt ∈ B are actions of player 1 and 2 in stage t,
respectively.
– Gk,l ∈ R
|A|×|B| is the payoff matrix given player 1’s state k ∈ K and player
2’s state l ∈ L. The element Gk,l(a, b) is player 1’s one stage payoff or player
2’s one stage cost if the state of player 1 and 2 are k and l, respectively and
the current action of player 1 and 2 are a and b, respectively.
– p ∈ ∆(K) and q ∈ ∆(L) are the initial probability on K and L respectively.
– P ∈ R|K|×|K| and Q ∈ R|L|×|L| are player 1 and 2’s transition matrices,
respectively. Pat,bt(kt, kt+1) is a conditional probability of the next state of
player 1, kt+1, given the current actions of both players and current state of
player 1. Similarly, Qat,bt(lt, lt+1) is a conditional probability of the next state
of player 2, lt+1, given the current actions of both players and current state of
player 2.
The nine-tuple (K,L,A,B, p, q, P, Q,G) is the common knowledge of the two
players. At stage t = 1, the initial state of player 1 and player 2 are chosen
independently by nature according to the initial probability p and q, respectively.
At stage, t ≥ 2, the state of player 1 and 2 are chosen according to the transition
probability Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt) and Qat−1,bt−1(lt−1, lt), respectively. Each player
does not know the state of the opponent player. Once the initial state is chosen, at
stage t = 1, 2...,N , each player simultaneously chooses its action which is observed
by both players. This is a perfect monitoring and perfect recall game, i.e. every
player can observe the current actions of both players, and record all history actions
of both players. At stage t, Gkt,lt(at, bt) is the one stage payoff of player 1, and the
one stage cost of player 2. None of the players can observe the one stage payoff,
and the total payoff is revealed to both players at the end of the game.
At the beginning of stage t, the available information of player 1 and 2 is
denoted by It = {k1, a1, b1, ...., kt−1, at−1, bt−1, kt} and Jt = {l1, a1, b1, ..., lt−1,
at−1, bt−1, lt}, respectively. The behavioral strategy of player 1 and 2 at stage t
are σt and τt, respectively, where σt : It 7→ ∆(A) and τt : Jt 7→ ∆(B). σt and τt
are the probability distributions over player 1’s actions at and player 2’s action
bt at stage t, respectively. Σ and T are the sets of behavior strategies of player 1
and 2, respectively. Strategy of player 1, σ ∈ Σ, is a sequence of σt and strategy
of player 2, τ ∈ T , is a sequence of τt. The payoff with initial probabilities p, q and
strategies σ, τ of an N -stage λ discounted game with λ ∈ (0, 1] is defined as
γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ) =Ep,q,σ,τ
( N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
Here, λ ∈ (0, 1) if N is infinite.
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An N -stage λ discounted game ΓN,λ(p, q) is defined as two player zero-sum
stochastic bayesian game equipped with initial probability p and q, strategy spaces
Σ and T and payoff function γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ). If λ = 1 and N is finite then it
represents N -stage game payoff. If λ < 1 and N is infinite then it is a discounted
game. If λ < 1 and N is finite then it is a truncated discounted game. Here,
we exclude the case when N = ∞ and λ = 1. In ΓN,λ(p, q), player 1 wants to
maximize the payoff and player 2 wants to minimize it. Therefore, player 1 has a
security level vN (p, q), which is also called the maxmin value of the game, defined
as
vN,λ(p, q) = max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ)
A strategy σ∗ ∈ Σ which can ensure player 1’s security level, i.e. vN,λ(p, q) =
min
τ∈T
γN,λ(p, q, σ
∗, τ), is called the security strategy of player 1.
Similarly, player 2s security level vN,λ(p, q), which is also called the minmax
value of the game, is defined as
vN,λ(p, q) = min
τ∈T
max
σ∈Σ
γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ)
The security strategy of player 2, τ∗ ∈ T guarantees player 2’s security level.
When vN,λ(p, q) = vN,λ(p, q), we can say the game has a value denoted by
vN,λ(p, q) = vN,λ(p, q) = vN,λ(p, q). According to Theorem 3.2 in [9], this game
has a value if N is finite or λ ∈ (0, 1).
3 Primal games and the related results
The N-stage λ-discounted game is also called the primal game in this paper. This
section introduces some properties of the game value and both players’ security
strategies in the primal game. Typical techniques are used to prove the lemmas,
and the proofs are in the Appendix.
In the primal game, there are two essential variables pt(kt) = Pr(kt|It) and
qt(lt) = Pr(lt|Jt), which are called the believes of kt and lt, respectively. It is easy
to see that p1 = p and q1 = q. It is straight forward to show that
pt+1(k
′) =
∑
k
Pa,b(k, k
′)
pt(k)X(a, k)
x¯pt,X(a)
.
= p+pt,X(k
′) (1)
qt+1(l
′) =
∑
l
Qa,b(l, l
′)
qt(l)Y (b, l)
y¯qt,Y (b)
.
= q+qt,Y (l
′) (2)
where X(:, k) ∈ ∆(A) and Y (:, l) ∈ ∆(B) are player 1 and 2’s strategies at stage
t given state k and l, respectively, x¯pt,X(a) =
∑
k
pt(k)X(a, k), and y¯qt,Y (b) =∑
l
qt(l)Y (b, l). Later, we will show that these two variables, together with stage t
if N is finite, is a sufficient statistic of the primal game. To prove this result, we
first show the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In primal game ΓN,λ(p, q), the game value vN,λ(p, q) is concave in p
and convex in q.
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For the simplicity of the mathematical expression of Lemma 2, we define
G¯(p, q,X, Y ) =
∑
k,l
p(k)q(l)
∑
a,b
X(a, k)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l)
Tp,q,X,Y (v) =G¯(p, q,X, Y ) + λ
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
x¯p,X(a)y¯q,Y (b)v(p
+
p,X, q
+
q,Y )
Lemma 2 Consider a primal game ΓN,λ(p, q). Let pt, qt be the believes at stage
t = 1, . . . , N with n = N + 1− t stages to go. The game value of the primal game
satisfies the following recursive formula
vn,λ(pt, qt) = max
X∈∆(A)K
min
Y ∈∆(B)L
Tpt,qt,X,Y (vn−1,λ) (3)
= min
Y ∈∆(B)L
max
X∈∆(A)K
Tpt,qt,X,Y (vn−1,λ) (4)
The optimal solution X∗ to equation (3) and the optimal solution Y ∗ to equation
(4) are player 1 and 2’s security strategies at stage t, respectively.
Moreover, player 1 and 2’s security strategies only depend on pt and qt, together
with t if N is finite.
The problem of the sufficient statistic pt and qt is that no player has full access
to it. Equation (1) and (2) indicate that the belief of player i’s state depends on
player i’s strategy, for i = 1, 2. While each player has its own strategy, it has no
access to the other player’s strategy, and hence can only compute either pt or qt.
To explore the full accessible sufficient statistic, we study the dual games of the
primal game in the next section.
4 Dual game and the related results
This section introduces two dual games of the primal game ΓN,λ(p, q), explains
how the game values and the strategies of the dual games are related to that of the
primal game, and finally provides the recursive formula and a sufficient statistic
of the two dual games.
The dual games are rooted from the Fenchel’s conjugate of the game value of
the primal game ΓN,λ(p, q) [4,18]. The Fenchel’s conjugate of vN,λ(p, q) regarding
p is the game value of type 1 dual game, and the Fenchel’s conjugate of vN,λ(p, q)
regarding q is the game value of type 2 dual game. Next, we will introduce the
two types of dual games.
Type 1 dual game can be specified by the nine-tuple (K,L,A,B, µ, q, P,Q,G),
where K,L,A, B, q, P,Q,G are defined the same as in the primal game and µ ∈
R
|K| is the initial realized vector payoff over player 1’s state. Type 1 dual game
Γ˜ 1N,λ(µ, q) is played similarly as in the primal game ΓN,λ(p, q) except that the
initial state of player 1 is chosen by itself rather than the nature. If p is player 1’s
strategy to choose its initial state, the payoff is
γ˜
1
N,λ(µ, q, p, σ, τ) = Ep,q,σ,τ
(
µ(k1) +
N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
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Similarly, type 2 dual game is specified by the nine-tuple (K,L,A,B, p, ν, P,Q,
G), where K,L,A,B, p, P,Q,G are defined the same as in the primal game and
ν ∈ R|L| is the initial realized vector payoff over player 2’s state. Type 2 dual
game Γ˜ 2N,λ(p, ν) is played similarly as in the primal game ΓN,λ(p, q) except that
the initial state of player 2 is chosen by itself rather than the nature. If q is player
2’s strategy to choose its initial state, then the payoff function is
γ˜
2
N,λ(p, ν, q, σ, τ) = Ep,q,σ,τ
(
ν(l1) +
N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
In both dual games, player 1 wants to maximize the payoff and player 2 wants to
minimize it. The game values of type 1 and 2 dual games are denoted by w1N,λ(µ, q)
and w2N,λ(p, ν), respectively. All the propositions and lemmas in this section can
be derived using typical techniques, and the proofs are in the Appendix.
We are interested in how the game values of the dual games are related to the
game value of the primal game.
Proposition 1 Let vn,λ(p, q) be the game value of the primal game Γn,λ(p, q),
and w1n,λ(µ, q) and w
2
n,λ(p, ν) be the game values of type 1 and 2 dual games,
respectively. We have
vn,λ(p, q) =min
µ
w
1
n,λ(µ, q)− p
T
µ (5)
vn,λ(p, q) =max
ν
w
2
n,λ(p, ν)− q
T
ν (6)
Moreover, player 2’s optimal strategy in type 1 dual game Γ˜ 1n,λ(µ
∗, q) is also
its optimal strategy in primal game Γn,λ(p, q), where µ
∗ is the optimal solution to
equation (5).
Similarly, player 1’s optimal strategy in type 2 dual game Γ˜ 2n,λ(p, ν
∗) is also
its optimal strategy in primal game ΓN,λ(p, q), where ν
∗ is the optimal solution to
equation (6).
In the primal game Γn,λ(p, q), define
αl(σ) =min
τ
Ep,q,σ,τ
( N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|l1 = l
)
βk(τ) =max
σ
Ep,q,σ,τ
( N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k1 = k
)
Let α(σ) = (αl(σ))l∈L and β(τ) = (βk(τ))k∈K. From the proof of Proposition 1,
we also show the following corollary.
Corollary 1 An optimal solution to equation (5) and equation (6) is
µ
∗ =− β(τ∗) (7)
ν
∗ =− α(σ∗) (8)
where σ∗ and τ∗ are player 1 and 2’s security strategies in the primal game
Γn,λ(p, q), respectively.
Moreover, w1n,λ(µ
∗, q) = w2n,λ(p, ν
∗) = 0, where µ∗ and ν∗ is given in equation
(7) and (8), respectively.
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While Proposition 1 derives the game value of the primal game from the dual
games, the following proposition provides the opposite direction.
Proposition 2 The values of type 1 and 2 dual games satisfy
w
1
n,λ(µ, q) =max
p
p
T
µ+ vn,λ(p, q) (9)
w
2
n,λ(p, ν) =min
q
q
T
ν + vn,λ(p, q) (10)
Proof For type 1 dual game,
w
1
n,λ(µ, q) =max
p
max
σ
min
τ
γ˜
1(µ, q, p, σ, τ)
=max
p
max
σ
min
τ
Ep,q,σ,τ
(
µ(k1) +
N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
=max
p
max
σ
min
τ
Ep
(
µ(k1)
)
+ Ep,q,σ,τ
( N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
=max
p
∑
k1
µ(k1)Pr(k1) + max
σ
min
τ
Ep,q,σ,τ
( N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
=max
p
p
T
µ+max
σ
min
τ
γn,λ(p, q, σ, τ)
=max
p
p
T
µ+ vn,λ(p, q)
By similar technique we can prove equation (10) for type 2 dual game. ⊓⊔
Proposition 3 The value of type 1 dual game satisfies the following recursive
formula:
w
1
n,λ(µ, q) =min
Y
min
βa∈A,b∈B
max
Π
∑
a,k
Π(a, k)
[
µ(k) +
∑
l,b
Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l)q(l)+
λ
∑
b
y¯q,Y (b)
(
w
1
n−1,λ(βa,b, q
+
q,Y )−
∑
k′
Pa,b(k, k
′)βa,b(k
′)
)]
(11)
.
=min
Y
min
β
max
Π
S
1
µ,q,Y,β,Π(w
1
n−1,λ)
where Π(a, k) = Pr(a ∩ k). The value of type 2 dual game satisfies the following
recursive formula:
w
2
n,λ(p, ν) =max
X
max
αa∈A,b∈B
min
Ψ
∑
b,l
Ψ(b, l)
[
ν(l) +
∑
k,a
Gk,l(a, b)X(b, l)p(k)+
λ
∑
a
xp,X(a)
(
w
2
n−1,λ(p
+
p,X , αa,b)−
∑
l′
Qa,b(l, l
′)αa,b(l
′)
)]
.
=max
X
max
α
min
Ψ
S
2
p,ν,X,α,Ψ (w
2
n−1,λ)
where Ψ(b, l) = Pr(b ∩ l).
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Based on Proposition 3, we see that besides the belief, there is another important
variable, µ in type 1 dual game, and ν in type 2 dual game. We call them the real-
ized vector payoffs on state k and l, respectively, and define them in the following
way.
Definition 1 Consider a type 1 dual game Γ˜ 1N,λ(µ, q). Let µ1 = µ be the initial
realized vector payoff, and β∗ be the optimal solution to the problem
w
1
n,λ(µt, qt) = min
Y
min
βa∈A,b∈B
max
Π
S
1
µt,qt,Y,β,Π(w
1
n−1,λ) (12)
where n = N + 1 − t for stage t. The realized vector payoff over state k at stage
t+ 1 is defined as µt+1 = β
∗
a,b.
Similarly, consider a type 2 dual game Γ˜ 2N,λ(p, ν). Let ν1 = ν be the initial
realized vector payoff, and α∗ be the optimal solution to the problem
w
2
n,λ(pt, νt) = max
X
max
αa∈A,b∈B
min
Ψ
S
2
pt,νt,X,α,Ψ (w
2
n−1,λ) (13)
where n = N + 1 − t for stage t. The realized vector payoff over state l at stage
t+ 1 is defined as νt+1 = α
∗
a,b.
In the next corollary, we show that pt, νt and µt, qt is player 1 and player 2’s
sufficient statistic in type 2 and type 1 dual game, respectively. The proof is in the
Appendix.
Corollary 2 Player 1’s security strategy at stage t in type 2 dual game Γ˜ 2N,λ(p, ν)
only depends on pt and νt, together with t if N is finite. Player 2’s security strategy
at stage t in type 1 dual game Γ˜ 1N,λ(µ, q) only depends on µt and qt, together with
t if N is finite.
From Proposition 1, Corollary 1, and Corollary 2, we build a path of looking for
the fully accessible sufficient statistics, and the security strategies of both players
in the primal game. Let’s assume µ∗ and ν∗ defined as in equation (7) and (8) are
found. Player 1 figures out its security strategy in type 2 dual game Γ˜ 2N,λ(p, ν
∗).
Notice that according to Corollary 2, player 1’s security strategy only depends on
pt and νt which are fully accessible by player 1. This security strategy in type
2 dual game is then used in the primal game. According to Proposition 1, this
strategy is also the security strategy in the primal game. Player 2 can follow the
similar steps to derive a security strategy in the primal game.
The problem is how to compute the µ∗ and ν∗ defined as in equation (7) and
(8). The next section will answer this question.
5 LP’s for both primal and dual games
Section 3 and 4 provide descriptive results about the game value and the security
strategies in primal games and dual games. This section provides prescriptive
results for both the primal and dual games. In [21], LP formulation was provided
to compute the optimal strategies in primal games but they did not introduce
it for dual games. To be more specific, this section gives the LP formulations to
compute the game values and security strategies of both players in primal and dual
games. Moreover, LP formulation to compute the optimal solution to problem (5)
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and (6) are proposed.
We define the realization plan of player 1, RIt(at) as
RIt(at) =p(k1)
t−1∏
s=1
Pas,bs(ks, ks+1)
t∏
s=1
σ
as
s (Is)
with RI0(a0) = p(k1), and Pa0,b0(k0, k1) = 1. It is straight forward to show that
RIt(at) =Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)σ
at
t (It)RIt−1(at−1) (14)
Similarly, the realization plan of player 2 is defined as,
SJt(bt) =q(l1)
t−1∏
s=1
Qas,bs(ls, ls+1)
t∏
s=1
τ
bs
s (Js)
with SJ0(b0) = q(l1) and Qa0,b0(l0, l1) = 1. We have
SJt(bt) =Qat−1,bt−1(lt−1, lt)τ
bt
t (Jt)SJt−1(bt−1) (15)
To build the LP formulation to compute the optimal solution to problem (5) and
(6), we introduce the weighted payoff UJt(σ, τ) and ZIt(σ, τ) of player 1 and 2 as
follows.
UJt(σ, τ) =
∑
k1,...kt
RIt−1(at−1)Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)
E
( N∑
s=t
λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs)|k1, ...kt,Jt
)
ZIt(σ, τ) =
∑
l1,...lt
SJt−1(bt−1)Qat−1,bt−1(lt−1, lt)
E
( N∑
s=t
λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs)|l1, ...lt, It
)
Based on the definition of U and Z, we find that αl(σ
∗) and βk(τ
∗) are related to
U and Z in the following way.
αl(σ
∗) =min
τ
UJ1(σ
∗
, τ),where J1 = {l} (16)
βk(τ
∗) =max
σ
ZI1(σ, τ
∗),where I1 = {k} (17)
To build the LP formulation to compute αl(σ
∗) and βk(τ
∗) and hence µ∗ and ν∗
in Corollary 1, we first provide recursive formulas for UJt(σ, τ) and ZIt(σ, τ) in
lemma 3 and recursive formulas for minτ UJt(σ, τ) and maxσ ZIt(σ, τ) in Corollary
3, and then set up LP’s for minτ UJt(σ, τ) and maxσ ZIt(σ, τ) in Lemma 4 and
finally αl(σ
∗) and βk(τ
∗) in Theorem 1.
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Lemma 3 The weighted payoffs UJt(σ, τ) and ZIt(σ, τ) satisfy the following re-
cursive formulas.
UJt(σ, τ) =
∑
bt
(∑
at
∑
k1,...kt
RIt(at)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt) +
∑
at
∑
lt+1
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)
UJt+1(σ, τ)
)
τ
bt
t (Jt); with UJN+1(σ, τ) = 0 (18)
ZIt(σ, τ) =
∑
at
(∑
bt
∑
l1,...lt
SJt(bt)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt) +
∑
bt
∑
kt+1
Pat,bt(kt, kt+1)
ZIt+1(σ, τ)
)
σ
at
t (It); with ZJN+1(σ, τ) = 0 (19)
Proof According to the definition, we have
UJt+1(σ, τ) =
∑
k1,...kt+1
RIt(at)Pat,bt(kt, kt+1)E
( N∑
s=t+1
λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs)|k1, ...kt+1,Jt+1
)
UJt(σ, τ) =
∑
k1,...kt
RIt−1(at−1)Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)E
( N∑
s=t
λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs)|k1, ...kt,Jt
)
=
∑
k1,...kt
RIt−1(at−1)Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)E
(
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k1, ...kt,Jt
)
+
∑
k1,...kt
RIt−1(at−1)Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)E
( N∑
s=t+1
λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs)|k1, ...kt,Jt
)
Term 1 :
∑
k1,...kt
RIt−1(at−1)Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)E
(
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k1, ...kt,Jt
)
=
∑
k1,...kt
RIt−1(at−1)Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)
∑
at,bt
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)Pr(at, bt|k1, ...kt,Jt)
=
∑
k1,...kt
RIt−1(at−1)Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)
∑
at,bt
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)σ
at
t (It)τ
bt
t (Jt)
=
∑
at,bt
∑
k1,...kt
RIt(at)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)τ
bt
t (Jt)
Term 2 :
∑
k1,...kt
RIt−1(at−1)Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)E
( N∑
s=t+1
λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs)|k1, ...kt,Jt
)
=
∑
k1,...kt
RIt−1(at−1)Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)
∑
kt+1,lt+1
∑
at,bt
Pat,bt(kt, kt+1)Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)
σ
at
t (It)τ
bt
t (Jt)E
( N∑
s=t+1
λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs)|k1, ...kt+1,Jt+1
)
=
∑
lt+1,at,bt
( ∑
k1,...kt+1
RIt (at)Pat,bt(kt, kt+1)E(
N∑
s=t+1
λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs)|k1, ...kt+1,
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Jt+1)
)
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)τ
bt
t (Jt)
=
∑
at,bt
∑
lt+1
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1).UJt+1 .τ
bt
t (Jt)
So, equation (18) is proved. Following the similar method, we can prove the recur-
sive formula of ZIt(σ, τ). ⊓⊔
Define player 1 and 2’s optimal weighted payoffs U∗Jt(σ) and Z
∗
It(τ) as
U
∗
Jt(σ) =minτt:N
UJt(σ, τ)
Z
∗
It(τ) =maxσt:N
ZIt(σ, τ)
where τt:N and σt:N is player 2 and 1’s behavior strategy from stage t to N ,
respectively. It is straight forward to show the following corollary.
Corollary 3 The optimal weighted payoffs U∗Jt(σ) and Z
∗
It(τ) satisfy the following
recursive formulas.
U
∗
Jt(σ) =minτt
∑
bt
(∑
at
∑
k1,...kt
RIt(at)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
+
∑
at
∑
lt+1
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)U
∗
Jt+1(σ)
)
τ
bt
t (Jt)
with U∗JN+1(σ) = 0.
Z
∗
It(τ) =maxσt
∑
at
(∑
bt
∑
l1,...lt
SJt(bt)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
+
∑
bt
∑
kt+1
Pat,bt(kt, kt+1)Z
∗
It+1(τ)
)
σ
at
t (It);
with Z∗IN+1(τ) = 0.
The optimal weighted payoff U∗Jt(σ) and Z
∗
It(τ) can be computed by LP. The LP
formulations are given in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 For any t = 1, . . . , N , U∗Jt(σ) and Z
∗
It(τ) can be computed by the
following LPs.
U
∗
Jt(σ) = max
U
UJt
s.t.∑
k1...ks
∑
as
RIs(as)λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs) +
∑
ls+1
∑
as
Qas,bs
(ls, ls+1)UJs+1 ≥ UJs ; ∀s = t...N,∀bs, ∀Jt ⊂ Js,
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with UJN+1 = 0, ∀JN+1.
Z
∗
It(τ) = min
Z
ZIt
s.t.∑
l1...ls
∑
bs
SJs(bs)λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs) +
∑
ks+1
∑
bs
Pas,bs
(ks, ks+1)ZIs+1 ≤ ZIs ; ∀s = t...N,∀as, ∀It ⊂ Is
(20)
with ZIN+1 = 0,∀IN+1.
Proof Let us define two optimization problems P1 and P2.
P1 : U¯Jt(σ) =max
U
UJt
s.t.
∑
k1...ks
∑
as
RIs (as)λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs) +
∑
ls+1∑
as
Qas,bs(ls, ls+1)UJs+1 ≥ UJs ; ∀s = t, ...N (21)
We know,
U
∗
Jt(σ) =minτt
∑
bt
(∑
at
∑
k1,...kt
RIt(at)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)+
∑
at
∑
lt+1
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)U
∗
Jt+1(σ)
)
τ
bt
t (Jt);
s.t. 1T τ btN (JN ) = 1
τ
bt
N (JN ) ≥ 0; ∀bN
The dual of this LP is,
P2 : U∗Jt(σ) =max
UJt
UJt
s.t.
∑
k1...kt
∑
at
RIt(at)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt) +
∑
lt+1
∑
at
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)U
∗
Jt+1 ≥ UJt ; ∀bt
For t = N ,
U¯JN (σ) =max
U
UJN
s.t.∑
k1...kN
∑
aN
RIN (aN )λ
N−1
GkN ,lN (aN , bN ) ≥ UJN (σ); ∀bN
U
∗
JN (σ) =max
U
UJN
s.t.∑
k1...kN
∑
aN
RIN (aN )λ
N−1
GkN ,lN (aN , bN ) ≥ UJN (σ); ∀bN
LP Formulations of Two-Player Zero-Sum Stochastic Bayesian games 13
From this we can see, for t = N , U¯JN (σ) = U
∗
JN (σ). Let us assume, U
∗
Jt+1 = U¯Jt+1 .
P3 : U∗Jt+1(σ) =max
U
UJt+1
s.t.
∑
k1...ks
∑
as
RIs(as)λ
s−1
Gks,ls(as, bs) +
∑
ls+1
∑
as
Qas,bs(ls, ls+1)UJs+1
≥ UJs ; ∀s = (t+ 1)...N,∀bs,Js ⊃ Jt+1
Let,U¯Jt , U¯Jt+1 , ...U¯JN be the optimal solution of P1. U
∗
Jt be the optimal solution
of P2.U¯∗Jt+1 , ...U¯
∗
JN be the optimal solution of P3. Here, U
∗ is feasible in P1. So,
U¯Jt ≥ U
∗
Jt . U¯Jt+1 ...U¯JN is feasible in P3. So, U
∗
Jt+1 ≥ U¯Jt+1 . For s = t, we can
write equation (21) as,
∑
k1...kt
∑
at
RIt(at)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt) +
∑
lt+1
∑
at
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)U¯Jt+1(σ) ≥ UJt(σ);
∴
∑
k1...kt
∑
at
RI(at)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt) +
∑
lt+1
∑
at
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)U
∗
J+1(σ) ≥ UJt(σ)
So, U¯Jt is feasible in P2. Then U
∗
Jt ≥ U¯Jt .Therefore, U¯Jt = U
∗
Jt , which completes
the proof.Similarly we can proof equation (20). ⊓⊔
Based on the LP in Lemma 4, we further develop the LP’s to compute U∗Jt(σ
∗) and
Z∗It(τ
∗) by considering the game value and the security strategies of the primal
game in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 Consider a primal game Γn,λ(p, q). Its game value satisfies
vn,λ(p, q)
=max
R
max
U
∑
l
q(l)UJ1 ; where J1 = {l} (22)
s.t.
∑
k1...kt
∑
at
RIt(at)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt) +
∑
lt+1
∑
at
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)
UJt+1 ≥ UJt ; ∀t = 1, ...n,∀bt, ∀Jt+1 ⊃ Jt (23)∑
at
RIt(at) = Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)RIt−1(at−1); ∀t = 1, ...n,∀It (24)
UJn+1 = 0; ∀Jn+1 (25)
RIt(at) ≥ 0; ∀It (26)
The optimal strategy of player 1 is,
σ
∗at
t (It) =
R∗It(at)
Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)R
∗
It−1
(at−1)
(27)
αl(σ
∗) =U∗J1 (28)
14 Nabiha Nasir Orpa, Lichun Li
where R∗ and U∗ are the optimal solution to (22). Similarly, we also have
vn,λ(p, q)
=min
S
min
Z
∑
k
p(k)ZI1 ; where I1 = {k}
s.t.
∑
l1...lt
∑
bt
SJt(bt)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt) +
∑
kt+1
∑
bt
Pat,bt(kt, kt+1)
ZIt+1 ≤ ZIt ; ∀t = 1, ...n , ∀at, ∀It+1 ⊃ It∑
bt
SJt(bt) = Qat−1,bt−1(lt−1, lt)SJt−1(bt−1);∀t = 1 : n, ∀Jt
ZIn+1 = 0; ∀In+1
SJt(bt) ≥ 0; ∀Jt
(29)
The optimal strategy of player 2 is,
τ
∗bt
t (Jt) =
S∗Jt(bt)
Qat−1,bt−1(lt−1, lt)S
∗
Jt−1
(bt−1)
(30)
βk(τ
∗) =Z∗I1 (31)
where Z∗ and S∗ are the optimal solution to (47).
Proof According to the discussion in the second paragraph on page 248 in [21],
the realization probabilities can serve as strategic variables of a player. We have,
vn,λ(p, q) =max
σ
min
τ
E
( n∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
=max
R
∑
l
q(l)min
τ l
E
( n∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|l
)
=max
R
∑
l
q(l)U∗J1(σ)
=max
R
max
U
∑
l
q(l)UJ1 , where J1 = {l}
s.t. equation(23− 26)
Let R∗ and U∗ be the optimal solution. Equation (14) implies that the optimal
strategy satisfies equation (27), and equation (16) implies equation (28). Following
the same steps, equation (47) can be shown. ⊓⊔
The size of the linear program (22-26) is polynomial with respect to the size of
|K|, |L|, |A|, |B| and exponential with respect to the length of the stage n. We first
examine the size of variables. When t = 1 the number of scalar variables for RIt is
|K||A|. When t = 2 the number of scalar variables for RIt is |K||A||B||K||A|. So,
when t = n the number of scalar variables for RIt is |K|(|A||B||K|)
n−1|A|. The
number of scalar variables for UJt is |L|(|A||B||L|)
n−1. Therefore, the number of
scalar variables has the order of O(|A|n|B|n(|K|n+|L|n)). For the constraints, con-
straint set (23) has |B||L| inequalities when t = 1, |B||L||A||B||L| inequalities when
t = 2, and |B||L|(|A||B||L|)n−1 inequalities when t = n. In constraint set (24), the
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number of equalities is |K| for t = 1, |K||A||B||K| for t = 2, and |K|(|A||B||K|)n−1
for t = n. There are |L|(|A||B||L|)n and |K|(|A||B||K|)n|A| equations in constraint
set (25) and (26), respectively. Therefore, the number of the constraints is in the
order of O(|A|n|B|n(|K|n + |L|n)). The computational complexity of LP (47) is
the same as that of LP (22-26).
Theorem 1 provides one LP to compute αl(σ
∗) (and hence µ∗), the security
level of player 1, and the security strategy of player 1 at the same time, and
another LP to compute βk(τ
∗) (and hence ν∗), the security level of player 2, and
the security strategy of player 2 at the same time. Based on the relation between
the game values of the primal game and the two dual games in Proposition 2, we
can further develop the LPs to compute the security level and the security strategy
of player 1 in type 2 dual game, and the security level and the security strategy
of player 2 in type 1 dual game.
Proposition 4 The game value of type 2 dual game Γ˜ 2n,λ(p, ν) satisfies,
w
2
n,λ(p, ν) =max
R
max
UJ
max
U0
U0 (32)
s.t. ν(l) + UJ1 ≥ U0, ∀l, where J1 = {l}∑
k1...kt
∑
at
RIt(at)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt) +
∑
lt+1
∑
at
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)
UJt+1 ≥ UJt ; ∀t = 1, ...n,∀bt, ∀Jt+1 ⊃ Jt∑
at
RIt(at) = Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)RIt−1(at−1); ∀t = 1, ...n;∀It
UJN+1 = 0; ∀JN+1
RIt(at) ≥ 0; ∀It
The optimal strategy of player 1 in type 2 dual game is,
σ
∗at
It
(It) =
R∗It(at)
Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)R
∗
It−1
(at−1)
where R∗ and U∗ is the optimal solution to problem (32). Similarly, the game value
of type 1 dual game Γ˜ 1n,λ(µ, q) satisfies,
w
1
n,λ(µ, q) =min
S
min
ZI
min
Z0
Z0 (33)
s.t. µ(k) + ZI1 ≤ Z0, ∀k,whereI1 = {k}∑
l1...lt
∑
bt
SJt(bt)λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt) +
∑
kt+1
∑
bt
Pat,bt(kt, kt+1)
ZIt+1 ≤ ZIt ; ∀t = 1, ...n;∀at, ∀It+1 ⊃ It∑
bt
SJt(bt) = Qat−1,bt−1(lt−1, lt)SJt−1(bt−1); ∀t = 1, ...n;∀Jt
ZIn+1 = 0; ∀In+1
SJt(bt) ≥ 0; ∀Jt
16 Nabiha Nasir Orpa, Lichun Li
The optimal strategy of player 2 is,
τ
∗bt
t (Jt) =
S∗Jt(bt)
Qat−1,bt−1(lt−1, lt)S
∗
Jt−1
(bt−1)
where S∗ and Z∗ is the optimal solution to problem (33).
Proof
w
2
n,λ(p, ν) = min
q
q
T
ν + vn,λ(p, q)
By using theorem 1 we can write the above equation as,
w
2
n,λ(p, ν) =min
q
q
T
ν +max
R
max
U
∑
l
q(l)UJ1
=min
q
max
R
max
U
∑
l
q(l)
(
ν(l) + UJ1
)
(34)
=min
q
max
R
max
U
F1(q,R, U)
where, F1(q,R, U) =
∑
l
q(l)
(
ν(l) + UJ1
)
s.t.
∑
k1...kt
∑
at
RIt(at)Gkt,lt(at, bt) +
∑
lt+1
∑
at
Qat,bt(lt, lt+1)
UJs+1 ≥ UJs (35)∑
It
RIt(at) = Pat−1,bt−1(kt−1, kt)RIt−1(at−1) (36)
RIt(at) ≥ 0 (37)∑
l
q(l) = 1 (38)
q(l) ≥ 0; ∀l (39)
Given U , R s.t. equation (34)-(37), which are linear constraints. Hence R is in
a compact convex set. Given U , q s.t. equation (38) and (39), which are linear
constraints. Hence q is in a compact convex set. Given U , F1(q,R, U) is linear
w.r.t. q and R. So, according to the minimax theorem we can write,
max
R
min
q
max
U
∑
l
q(l)
(
ν(l) + UJ1
)
s.t. equation (35) to (39)
Given R, U s.t. equation (34), which is linear. Hence U is a compact convex set.
Given R, q s.t. equation (37) and (38) which are linear. Hence q is in a compact
convex set. Given R, F1(q,R, U) is linear in q and U . Then we can write,
max
R
max
U
min
q
∑
l
q(l)
(
ν(l) + UJ1
)
s.t. equation (35) to (39)
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Table 1 The total channel capacity matrix (Payoff matrix), given sensors’ type k and jammer’s
type l
❍
❍
❍
❍
k
l
1 (0.5 km) 2 (2 km)
1 ([1 1] km)
108.89 113.78 122.30 154.40
108.89 113.78 122.30 154.40
2 ([1 5] km)
11.48 107.38 24.89 107.42
99.04 20.15 100.26 60.77
3 ([5 5] km)
1.64 13.75 2.85 13.79
1.64 13.75 2.85 13.79
We have,
min
q
∑
l
q(l)
(
ν(l) + UJ1
)
s.t.
∑
l
q(l) = 1
q(l) ≥ 0; ∀l
The dual problem of this is,
max
U0
U0
s.t. ν(l) + UJ1 ≥ U0, ∀l
So the proposition is proved. By using the same method we can prove the linear
program (33). ⊓⊔
The level of computational complexity of the LP for dual game is same as the
primal game LP.
6 Case study
Jamming problems in underwater acoustic sensor networks can be modeled as
a strategic game by game theoretic approach. [20] represented jamming in an
underwater sensor network as a Bayesian two-player zero-sum one-shot game and
evaluated how the nodes’ position (state) effect the equilibrium and [7] extended
it to a repeated Bayesian game with uncertainties on both sides. In this paper we
have used the same network model and formulated it as a two-player zero-sum
stochastic game where both players are partially informed. The network has four
sensors (s1, s2, s3, s4) and one jammer. The goal of the sensors is to transmit data
to a sink node by using a shared spectrum at [10,40] KHz which is divided into
two channels, B1 = [10, 25] kHz and B2 = [25, 40] kHz whereas the jammer wants
to block this data transfer. Each channel can be used by one sensor so that at a
time only 2 sensors can transmit data. The distance between the sensor and sink
node can be 1 km or 5 km. Let, the distances from sink node to s1, s2, s3 and s4
are 1 km, 5 km, 1 km and 5 km respectively. The jammer distance from the sink
node can be 0.5 km or 2 km. Let us consider sensors as player 1 and the jammer
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Table 2 P (transition matrix for sensor’s state)
❍
❍
❍
❍
a
b
1 2
1
0.8 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0
0.1 0.4 0.5 0 0.5 0.5
0.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2
2
0.2 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.4
0.5 0.5 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0.1 0.1 0.8
Table 3 Q (transition matrix for jammer’s state)
❍
❍
❍
❍
a
b
1 2
1
1 0 0.2 0.8
0.5 0.5 0.1 0.9
2
0.6 0.4 0.7 0.3
0.5 0.5 0 1
Table 4 Optimal security strategy of the sensors in the 2-stage primal stochastic game given
history information
It 1 2 3 1111 1112
σ∗t (It)(a = 1) 1 0 1 0 0
σ
∗
t (It)(a = 2) 0 1 0 1 1
It 1113 1121 1122 2211 2212
σ
∗
t (It)(a = 1) 0 0 0 0 0.423
σ
∗
t (It)(a = 2) 1 1 1 1 0.577
It 2222 3111 3112 3113 3121
σ∗t (It)(a = 1) 0.451 0 0.490 0 0
σ∗t (It)(a = 2) 0.549 1 0.510 1 1
It 3122 3123
σ∗t (It)(a = 1) 0.205 0
σ
∗
t (It)(a = 2) 0.795 1
Table 5 Optimal security strategy of the jammer in the 2-stage primal stochastic game given
history information
Jt 1 2 1111 1121
τ∗t (Jt)(b = 1) 0 1 0 0
τ
∗
t (Jt)(b = 2) 1 0 0 1
Jt 1122 1211 1212 1221
τ
∗
t (Jt)(b = 1) 0.56 0 0 0.31
τ
∗
t (Jt)(b = 2) 0.44 0 0 0.69
Jt 1222 2111 2112 2211
τ∗t (Jt)(b = 1) 1 0.068 1 0.068
τ∗t (Jt)(b = 2) 0 0.932 0 0.932
Jt 2212
τ
∗
t (Jt)(b = 1) 1
τ
∗
t (Jt)(b = 2) 0
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as player 2. The possible states for player 1 are [1,1], [1,5] and [5,5] and states
for player 2 are [0.5] and [2]. For sensors, we are denoting [1,5] and [5,1] as the
same state. The initial state probabilities of player 1 and 2 are p = [0.5 0.3 0.2]
and q = [0.5 0.5] respectively. The sensors coordinate with each other to use the
channels so that they can maximize the data transmission. Channel 1 is more
effective for the sensors which are far away and channel 2 is better for the sensors
close by. Though the sensors and the jammer do not know each others position, the
jammer can observe whether a channel is used by a far away sensor or a close by
sensor. For each time period, the jammer can only generate noises in one channel
and sensors are able to detect it. The jammer tries to minimize the throughput
of the channels. If the sensor state is [1,1], the active sensors are s1 and s3. The
feasible actions are s1 using channel 1 while s3 using channel 2 (action 1), and
s1 using channel 2 while s3 using channel 1 (action 2). If the sensor state is [5,5],
the active sensors are s2 and s4. The feasible actions are s2 using channel 1 while
s4 using channel 2 (action 1), and s2 using channel 2 while s4 uses channel 1
(action 2). If the sensor state is [1,5], the feasible actions are faraway sensor using
channel 1 while nearby sensor using channel 2 (action 1), and faraway sensor using
channel 2 while nearby sensor using channel 1 (action 2). Similarly, the jammers
actions are blocking channel 1 which is action 1 or channel 2 which is action 2.
The payoff matrix is in Table 1. As we are modeling this network as a stochastic
game there will be transition matrices for both player’s state. Table 2 and 3 show
the transition matrices of sensors’ and jammer’s state, respectively.
Let the game be played for two stages. The linear program of the sensors is
given in Theorem 1 from which we can compute the security level and the security
strategy of sensors. The computed security level of sensors is 167.26 bit/s and the
optimal security strategy is shown in Table 4. Similarly, for jammer we computed
the security level and optimal strategy by using LP (47) and equation (30). The
security level of jammer is 167.26 and the security strategy is in Table 5.
The security levels of both players are the same. Hence, this is the game value.
We, then, used the security strategies of both players in the jamming game. For
each experiment, we run the game for 1000 times, and the experiment was did for
60 times. The total throughput in the jamming game varies from 163.5 bits/s to
171.4 bits/s with an average capacity to be 167.45 which is close to the security
level we got from LP of sensors and jammer.
According to equation (28) and (31) we computed the value of a specific
initial realized vector payoff of sensor’s state in type 1 dual game and initial
realized vector payoff of jammer’s state in type 2 dual game. We had µ∗ =
−[219.28 136.16 83.83] and ν∗ = −[151.24 183.27]. By using this initial re-
alized vector payoff, we computed the LPs of dual game (32) and (33). In both
cases the value of the game is zero which satisfies corollary 1. The optimal strategy
of sensors in type 2 dual game is in Table 6 and the optimal strategy of jammer
in type 1 dual game is in Table 7.
We can see for this specific initial realized vector payoff, the security strategy
of sensors and jammer in the dual games is the same as in primal game which
satisfies Proposition 1.
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Table 6 Optimal security strategy of the sensors in the 2-stage Dual stochastic game given
history information
It 1 2 3 1111 1112
σ∗t (It)(a = 1) 1 0 1 0 0
σ∗t (It)(a = 2) 0 1 0 1 1
It 1113 1121 1122 2211 2212
σ
∗
t (It)(a = 1) 0 0 0 0 0.423
σ
∗
t (It)(a = 2) 1 1 1 1 0.577
It 2222 3111 3112 3113 3121
σ∗t (It)(a = 1) 0.451 0 0.490 0 0
σ∗t (It)(a = 2) 0.549 1 0.510 1 1
It 3122 3123
σ∗t (It)(a = 1) 0.205 0
σ∗t (It)(a = 2) 0.795 1
Table 7 Optimal security strategy of the jammer in the 2-stage dual stochastic game given
history information
Jt 1 2 1111 1121
τ∗t (Jt)(b = 1) 0 1 0 0
τ∗t (Jt)(b = 2) 1 0 0 1
Jt 1122 1211 1212 1221
τ
∗
t (Jt)(b = 1) 0.56 0 0 0.31
τ
∗
t (Jt)(b = 2) 0.44 0 0 0.69
Jt 1222 2111 2112 2211
τ∗t (Jt)(b = 1) 1 0.068 1 0.068
τ∗t (Jt)(b = 2) 0 0.932 0 0.932
Jt 2212
τ∗t (Jt)(b = 1) 1
τ∗t (Jt)(b = 2) 0
7 Conclusion
This paper studies two-player zero-sum stochastic Bayesian games, computes the
characteristics of primal and dual game, and shows the sufficient statistics in dual
game are fully accessible. It has also formulated LPs for both primal and dual game
from which we can get the game values and optimal strategies of both players. We
are interested in extending this work to infinite horizon cases and check how the
optimal strategies change for infinite time.
Appendix
Lemma 5
vn−1,λ(αp, q) = αvn−1,λ(p, q)
vn−1,λ(p, αq) = αvn−1,λ(p, q)
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Proof For n = 1,
vn,λ(αp, q) = max
X
min
Y
[
∑
k,l
αp(k)q(l)
∑
a,b
X(a, k)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l)]
= max
X
min
Y
α[
∑
k,l
p(k)q(l)
∑
a,b
X(a, k)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l)]
= αvn,λ(p, q)
Suppose, for n, vn,λ(αp, q) = αvn,λ(p, q). For n+ 1,
vn+1,λ(αp, q) = max
X
min
Y
[
∑
k,l
αp(k)q(l)
∑
a,b
X(a, k)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) +
∑
a,b
∑
k
αp(k)
X(a, k)yq,y(b)vn,λ
(∑
k
pa,b(k, k
′)
αp(k)X(a, k)∑
k αp(k)X(a, k)
, q
+
)]
]
= max
X
min
Y
α[
∑
k,l
p(k)q(l)
∑
a,b
X(a, k)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) +
∑
a,b
∑
k
p(k)
X(a, k)yq,y(b)vn,λ
(∑
k
pa,b(k, k
′)
p(k)X(a, k)∑
k p(k)X(a, k)
, q
+
)]
]
= αvn+1,λ(p, q)
So, the proof is complete. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6 F (Π,Y ) is concave in Π, where F (Π,Y ) is defined as equation (48).
Proof According to Lemma 5, vn−1,λ(αp, q) = αvn−1,λ(p, q). Then we can write,
F (Π,Y ) = max
Π
min
Y
[∑
k,a
Π(a, k)µ(k) +
∑
k,l,a,b
Π(a, k)q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
a,b,k
Π(a, k)yq,y(b)vn−1,λ
(∑
k
pa,b(k, k
′)
Π(a, k)∑
kΠ(a, k)
, q
+
)]
= max
Π
min
Y
[∑
k,a
Π(a, k)µ(k) +
∑
k,l,a,b
Π(a, k)q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
a,b
yq,y(b)vn−1,λ
(∑
k
pa,b(k, k
′)Π(a, k), q+
)]
= max
Π
min
Y
[∑
k,a
Π(a, k)µ(k) +
∑
k,l,a,b
Π(a, k)q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
a,b,k
Π(a, k)vn−1,λ
(
pa,b(k, k
′), q+
)]
From this equation we can see that F (Π,Y ) is linear in Π. So F (Π,Y ) is both
concave and convex in Π. The proof is complete. ⊓⊔
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7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof Let, initial probability, p = αwpw where W ∈ {1, 2}. Here, p, pw ∈ ∆K,
αw ∈ ∆W and σ
w is optimal for player 1 in game Γn,λ(pw, q). In initial state k,
player 1 uses σw(k, :) with probability αw
pw(k)
p(k) . Then the payoff is,
γn,λ(δk, δl, σ(k), τ(l)) =Eσ(k),τ(l)
( n∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k, l
)
=Ew
[
Eσw(k),τ(l)
( n∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k, l, w
)]
=
∑
w
Pr(w|k, l)
[
Eσw(k),τl
( n∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k, l, w
)]
=
∑
w
Pr(w|k)γn,λ(δk, δl, σ
w(k), τl)
=
∑
w
αw
pw(k)
p(k)
γn,λ(δk, δl, σ
w(k), τl)
γn,λ(p, q, σ, τ) =
∑
k,l
p(k)q(l)γn,λ(δk, δl, σ(k), τ(l))
=
∑
k,l
p(k)q(l)
∑
w
αw
pw(k)
p(k)
γn,λ(δk, δl, σ
w(k), τl)
=
∑
k,l
p(k)q(l)
∑
w
αw
pw(k)
p(k)
γn,λ(δk, δl, σ
w(k), τl)
=
∑
k,l
q(l)
∑
w
αwpw(k)γn,λ(δk, δl, σ
w(k), τl)
=
∑
w
αw
∑
k,l
pw(k)q(l)γn,λ(δk, δl, σ
w(k), τl)
=
∑
w
αwγn,λ(pw, q, σ
w
, τ)
This is true for any τ . Let, τ∗ is the optimal strategy in Γn,λ(p, q). So,
∑
w
αwγn,λ(pw, q, σ
w
, τ
∗) >
∑
w
αwvn,λ(pw, q)
⇒ γn,λ(p, q, σ, τ
∗) >
∑
w
αwvn,λ(pw, q)
⇒ vn,λ(p, q) >
∑
w
αwvn,λ(pw, q); [As vn,λ(p, q) ≥ γn,λ(p, q, σ, τ
∗)]
From this we can say that vn,λ(p, q) is concave on p. By following the similar
method me can prove that vn,λ(p, q) is convex on q. ⊓⊔
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7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof The payoff of the primal game can be written as,
γn,λ(p, q, σ, τ) = G¯(p, q,X, Y ) + Ep,q,σ,τ (
n∑
t′=2
λ
t′−1
Gkt′ lt′ (at′ , bt′))
Ep,q,σ,τ
( n∑
t′=2
λ
t′−1
Gkt′ lt′ (at′ , bt′)
)
=E
[
E
( n∑
t′=2
λ
t′−1
Gkt′ lt′ (at′ , bt′)|k2 = k, l2 = l, a1 = a, b1 = b
)]
=
∑
k2,l2,a1,b1
E
( n∑
t′=2
λ
t′−1
Gkt′ lt′ (at′ , bt′)|k2, l2, a1, b1
)
Pr(k2, l2, a1, b1)
=
∑
k2,l2,a1,b1
E
( n∑
t′=2
λ
t′−1
Gkt′ lt′ (at′ , bt′)|k2, l2, a1, b1
) ∑
k1,l1
Pr(k2, l2, a1, b1, k1, l1)
=
∑
k2,l2,i1,j1
E(
n∑
t′=2
λ
t′−1
Gkt′ lt′ (at′ , bt′)|k2, l2, a1, b1)
∑
k1,l1
Pr(k2, l2|a1, b1, k1, l1)
Pr(a1, b1, k1, l1)
=
∑
k2,l2,a1,b1
E(
n∑
t′=2
λ
t′−1
Gkt′ lt′ (at′ , bt′)|k2, l2, a1, b1)
∑
k1
Pr(k2|a1, b1, k1)Pr(a1, k1)
∑
l1
Pr(l2|a1, b1, l1)Pr(b1, l1)
=
∑
k2,l2,a1,b1
E(
n∑
t′=2
λ
t′−1
Gkt′ lt′ (at′ , bt′)|k2, l2, a1, b1)
∑
k1
Pr(k2|a1, b1, k1)
Pr(a1, k1)∑
k1
Pr(a1, k1)
∑
k1
Pr(a1, k1)
∑
l1
Pr(l2|a1, b1, l1)
Pr(b1, l1)∑
l1
Pr(b1, l1)
∑
l1
Pr(b1, l1)
=
∑
a1,b1
∑
k2,l2
∑
k1
Pr(k2|a1, b1, k1)
Pr(a1, k1)∑
k1
Pr(a1, k1)
∑
l1
Pr(l2|a1, b1, l1)
Pr(b1, l1)∑
l1
Pr(b1, l1)
E
( n−1∑
t=1
λ
t
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k2, l2, a1, b1
)∑
k1
Pr(a1, k1)
∑
l1
Pr(b1, l1); [Here t = t
′ − 1]
=λ
∑
a1,b1
γn−1,λ(p
+
, q
+
, σ, τ)
∑
k1
Pr(a1, k1)
∑
l1
Pr(b1, l1)
=λ
∑
a1,b1
[∑
k1
Pr(a1|k1)Pr(k1)
][∑
l1
Pr(b1|l1)Pr(l1)
]
γn−1,λ(p
+
, q
+
, σ, τ)
=λ
∑
a1
xp,X(a)
∑
b1
yq,Y (b)γn−1,λ(p
+
, q
+
, σ, τ)
So we can write,
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γn,λ(p, q, σ, τ) =G¯(p, q,X, Y ) + λ
∑
a1
∑
b1
x¯p,X(a)y¯q,Y (b)γn−1,λ(p
+
, q
+
, σ, τ)
Let us define an auxiliary zero-sum game Γˆn,λ(p, q) where the payoff function for
player 1 is defined by,
f
p,q
n,λ = G¯(p, q,X, Y ) + λ
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
x¯p,X(a)y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ(p
+
, q
+)
By following the similar proof as [13] we can say, fp,qn,λ is concave in X and convex
in Y . Given X, G¯(p, q,X, Y ) is linear w.r.t. Y and given Y , it is linear w.r.t. X.
Let, X = ΘX ′ + (1−Θ)X ′′. As vn−1,λ is concave in p,
vn−1,λ(
∑
a,b
x¯p,X (a)y¯q,Y (b)p
+
, q
+) ≥Θvn−1,λ(
∑
a,b
x¯
′
p,X(a)y¯q,Y (b)p
+
X′ , q
+) + (1−Θ)
vn−1,λ(
∑
a,b
x¯
′′
p,X(a)y¯q,Y (b)p
+
X′′ , q
+)
As vn−1,λ(αp, q) = αvn−1,λ(p, q), we can write the above equation as,
∑
a,b
x¯p,X(a)y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ(p
+
, q
+) ≥ Θ
∑
a,b
x¯
′
p,X′(a)y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ(p
+
X′ , q
+) + (1− Θ)
∑
a,b
x¯
′′
p,X′′ (a)y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ(p
+
X′′ , q
+)
⇒ G¯(p, q,X, Y ) +
∑
a,b
x¯p,X(a)y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ(p
+
, q
+) ≥ Θ
(
G¯(p, q,X ′, Y ) +
∑
a,b
x¯
′
p,X′(a)
y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ(p
+
X′ , q
+)
)
+ (1−Θ)
(
(G¯(p, q,X ′′, Y ) +
∑
a,b
x¯
′′
p,X′′ (a)y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ(p
+
X′′ , q
+)
)
⇒ fp,qn,λ(X,Y ) ≥ Θf
p,q
n,λ(X
′
, Y ) + (1−Θ)fp,qn,λ(X
′′
, Y )
From this we can say fp,qn,λ(X,Y ) is concave inX. By using the similar steps we can
prove fp,qn,λ(X,Y ) is convex in Y . So, according to [17], ΓˆN,λ(p, q) has a value. Let,
the value is fn,λ(p, q). In ΓˆN,λ(p, q) at stage 1, X
∗ and Y ∗ is optimal for player
1 and 2 respectively. We will now prove that player 1 can guarantee fn,λ(p, q) in
Γn,λ(p, q). Let, σ ∈ Σ be as follows: At stage 1, play X
∗. From stage 2 to n, play
the optimal strategy σa of stage 2 to n in Γn,λ(p, q). Let, τ ∈ T and denote by Y
in ∆(B) the mixed action played by τ at stage 1 and for each (a, b) ∈ A × B, by
τa,b the strategy played by player 2 at stage 2 to n if (a, b) is played at stage 1.
Then
γn,λ(p, q, σ, τ) =G¯(p, q,X
∗
, Y ) + λ
∑
a1,b1
x¯
∗
p,X∗(a)y¯q,Y (b)γn−1(p
+
X∗ , q
+
, σ, τ) (40)
f
p,q
n,λ(X
∗
, Y ) =G¯(p, q,X∗, Y ) + λ
∑
a,b
x¯
∗
p,X∗(a)y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ(p
+
X∗ , q
+) (41)
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For 1 stage game,
γn−1,λ(p
+
X∗ , q
+
, σa, τ) ≥ vn−1,λ(p
+
X∗ , q
+) (42)
From equation (40),(41), (42) we can write, γn,λ(p, q, σ, τ) ≥ f
p,q
n,λ(X
∗, Y ) and we
know fp,qn,λ(X
∗, Y ) ≥ fn,λ(p, q).
∴ γn,λ(p, q, σ, τ) ≥ f
p,q
n,λ(X
∗
, Y ) ≥ fn,λ(p, q); [This is true for any τ ]
⇒ γn,λ(p, q, σ, τ
∗) ≥ fp,qn,λ(X
∗
, Y ) ≥ fn,λ(p, q)
∴ vn(p, q) ≥ fn(p, q); [As vn(p, q) ≥ γn(p, q, σ, τ
∗)]
By using the similar method we can prove vn(p, q) 6 fn(p, q). That means,
vn(p, q) = fn(p, q). ⊓⊔
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof For type 1: Let, σ˜∗ and τ˜∗ be the optimal strategy of player 1 and 2 respec-
tively in type 1 dual game.
γ˜
1
N,λ(µ, q, p, σ, τ˜
∗) ≤ γ˜1N,λ(µ, q, p, σ˜
∗
, τ˜
∗)
⇒γ˜1N,λ(µ, q, p, σ, τ˜
∗) ≤ w1N,λ(µ, q)
⇒Ep,q,σ,τ˜∗
(
µ(k1) +
N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
≤ w1N,λ(µ, q)
⇒
∑
k1
µ(k1)Pr(k1) + γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ˜
∗) ≤ w1N,λ(µ, q)
⇒pTµ+ γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ˜
∗) ≤ w1N,λ(µ, q)
⇒γN,λ(p, q, σ
∗
, τ˜
∗) ≤ w1N,λ(µ, q)− p
T
µ (43)
⇒γN,λ(p, q, σ
∗
, τ
∗) ≤ w1N,λ(µ, q)− p
T
µ;
⇒vN,λ(p, q) ≤ w
1
N,λ(µ, q)− p
T
µ; [for any p, q and µ]
vN,λ(p, q) ≤ w
1
N,λ(µ, q)− p
T
µ (44)
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Let, τ∗ be the optimal strategy of player 2 in primal game ΓN,λ(p, q). Let us define,
β(τ∗) = maxσk Eσ,τ∗,q(
N∑
t=1
λt−1Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k1 = k)
p
T
β(τ∗) =
∑
k1
Pr(k1)max
σk
Eσ,τ∗,q(
N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k1 = k)
= max
σ
∑
k1
Pr(k1)Eσ,τ∗,q(
N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k1 = k)
= max
σ
Ep
[
Eσ,τ∗,q
( N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)|k1 = k
)]
= max
σ
Ep,σ,τ∗,q
( N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
= vN,λ(p, q)
(45)
In dual game Γ˜ 1(−β(τ∗), q),
γ˜
1
N,λ(µ, q, p, σ, τ
∗) = Ep
(
− β(τ∗)(k1)
)
+ Eσ,τ∗,p,q
( N∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
=
∑
k1
−β(τ∗)(k1)Pr(k1) + γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ
∗)
= pT [−βk(τ
∗)] + γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ
∗)
= −vN,λ(p, q) + γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ
∗)
γN,λ(p, q, σ
∗
, τ
∗) ≥ γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ
∗)
⇒ vN,λ(p, q) ≥ γN,λ(p, q, σ, τ
∗)
So, we can say,
γ˜
1
N,λ(µ, q, p, σ, τ
∗) ≤ 0; [For any σ, p, q]
γ˜
1
N,λ(µ, q, p, σ˜∗, τ
∗) ≤ 0
⇒ w1N,λ(−β(τ
∗), q) ≤ 0
⇒ w1N,λ(−β(τ
∗), q) ≤ vN,λ(p, q) + p
T (−β(τ∗))
⇒ vN,λ(p, q) ≥ w
1
N,λ(−β(τ
∗), q)− [pT (−β(τ∗)]
⇒ vN,λ(p, q) ≥ w
1
N,λ(µ, q)− [p
T
µ]
So we can say for some specific µ = −β(τ∗) in type 1 dual game,
vN,λ(p, q) = w
1
N,λ(µ, q)− p
T
µ (46)
In Γ˜ 1n,λ(µ, q) the optimal strategy of player 2 is τ˜
∗. So from equation (43) we get,
γn,λ(p, q, σ
∗
, τ˜
∗) ≤ w1n,λ(µ, q)− p
T
µ; ∀µ
γn,λ(p, q, σ
∗
, τ˜
∗) ≥ vn,λ(p, q)
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If µ = −β(τ∗) we can write equation (47) as,
γn,λ(p, q, σ
∗
, τ˜
∗) ≤ vn,λ(p, q)
∴γn,λ(p, q, σ
∗
, τ˜
∗) = vn,λ(p, q)
∴ τ˜∗ is also the optimal in Γn,λ(p, q). Similarly, we can prove the equation for
type 2 dual game. According to equation (45) pTβ(τ∗) = vN,λ(p, q). Then for
µ = −β(τ∗) we can write equation (46) as,
vn,λ(p, q) = w
1
n,λ(µ, q)− p
T
µ
⇒ vn,λ(p, q) = w
1
n,λ(µ, q) + vn,λ(p, q)
⇒ w1n,λ(µ
∗
, q) = 0
Similarly, we can prove w2n,λ(p, ν
∗) = 0. ⊓⊔
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof According to equation (9),
w
1
n,λ(µ, q) = max
p
p
T
µ+ vn,λ(p, q)
= max
p
p
T
µ+max
X
min
Y
[
G¯(p, q,X, Y ) + λ
∑
a,b
x¯p,X(a)y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ(p
+
, q
+)
]
= max
p
p
T
µ+max
X
min
Y
[∑
k,l
p(k)q(l)
∑
a,b
X(a, k)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
a,b
∑
k
p(k)X(a, k)yq,Y (b)vn−1,λ
(∑
k
Pa,b(k, k
′)
p(k)X(a, k)∑
k p(k)X(a, k)
, q
+
)]
= max
p
max
X
min
Y
[∑
k
Pr(k)µ(k) +
∑
k,l,a,b
Pr(k)q(l)Pr(a|k)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l)
+ λ
∑
a,b,k
Pr(k)Pr(a|k)yq,Y (b)vn−1,λ
(∑
k
Pa,b(k, k
′)
Pr(k)Pr(a|k)∑
k Pr(k)Pr(a|k)
, q
+
)]
= max
Π
min
Y
[∑
k,a
Π(a, k)µ(k) + λ
∑
k,l,a,b
Π(a, k)q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) +
∑
a,b,k
Π(a, k)
yq,Y (b)vn−1,λ
(∑
k
pa,b(k, k
′)
Π(a, k)∑
kΠ(a, k)
, q
+
)]
; [Let, Π(a, k) = Pr(a ∩ k)]
(47)
= max
Π
min
Y
F (Π,Y ) (48)
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According to Lemma 6 we can write,
F (Π,Y ) = max
Π
min
Y
[∑
k,a
Π(a, k)µ(k) +
∑
k,l,a,b
Π(a, k)q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
a,b,k
Π(a, k)y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ
(∑
k
Pa,b(k, k
′)
Π(a, k)∑
kΠ(a, k)
, q
+
)]
= max
Π
min
Y
[∑
k,a
Π(a, k)µ(k) +
∑
k,l,a,b
Π(a, k)q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
a,b
y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ
(∑
k
Pa,b(k, k
′)Π(a, k), q+
)]
= max
Π
min
Y
[∑
k,a
Π(a, k)µ(k) +
∑
k,l,a,b
Π(a, k)q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
a,b,k
Π(a, k)y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ
(∑
k
Pa,b(k, k
′), q+
)]
F (Π,Y ) is linear in Y and concave in Π. According to Sion’s theorm [17],
w
1
n,λ(µ, q) = max
Π
min
Y
F (Π,Y )
= min
Y
max
Π
F (Π,Y )
w
1
n,λ(µ, q)
= min
Y
max
Π
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)
[
µ(k) +
∑
l,b
q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
b
y¯q,Y (b)vn−1,λ(p
+
, q
+)
]
= min
Y
max
Π
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)
[
µ(k) +
∑
l,b
q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
b
y¯q,Y (b)min
β
(
w
1
n−1,λ(β, q)
− p+
T
β
)]
= min
Y
max
Π
min
β
[∑
k,a
Π(a, k)µ(k) +
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)
∑
l,b
q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)
∑
b
y¯q,Y (b)w
1
n−1,λ(β, q)− λ
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)
∑
b
y¯q,Y (b)
∑
k,k′
Pa,b(k, k
′)
p(k)X(a, k)∑
k
p(k)X(a, k)
β(k′)
]
= min
Y
max
Π
min
β
[∑
k,a
Π(a, k)µ(k) +
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)
∑
l,b
q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)
∑
b
y¯q,Y (b)w
1
n−1,λ(β, q)− λ
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)
∑
b
y¯q,Y (b)
∑
k,k′
Pa,b(k, k
′)
Π(a, k)∑
k
Π(a, k)
β(k′)
]
= min
Y
max
Π
min
β
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)
[
µ(k) +
∑
l,b
q(l)Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l) + λ
∑
b
y¯q,Y (b)
(
w
1
n−1,λ(β, q)
−
∑
a,k′
Pa,b(k, k
′)β(k′)
]
= min
Y
max
Π
min
β
Φ(Π,β)
LP Formulations of Two-Player Zero-Sum Stochastic Bayesian games 29
w1n−1,λ(β, q) is convex in β. To prove that we need to show,
w
1
n−1,λ(β, q) ≤ tw
1
n−1,λ(β1, q) + (1− t)tw
1
n−1,λ(β2, q)
where, β = tβ1 + (1− t)β2 and t ∈ [0, 1]
L.H.S = w1n−1,λ(β, q)
= w1n−1,λ(tβ1 + (1− t)β2, q)
= max
p
p
T (tβ1 + (1− t)β2) + vn−1,λ(p, q)
= max
p
p
T
tβ1 + p
T (1− t)β2) + vn−1,λ(p, q) + tvn−1,λ(p, q)− tvn−1,λ(p, q)
= max
p
[
t[pTβ1 + vn−1,λ(p, q)] + (1− t)[p
T
β2 + vn−1,λ(p, q)]
]
R.H.S = tw1n−1,λ(β1, q) + (1− t)tw
1
n−1,λ(β2, q)
= max
p
t[pTβ1 + vn−1,λ(p, q)] + max
p
(1− t)[pTβ2 + vn−1,λ(p, q)]
We know,
max
p
[
t[pTβ1 + vn−1,λ(p, q)] + (1− t)[p
T
β2 + vn−1,λ(p, q)]
]
≤ max
p
t[pTβ1+
vn−1,λ(p, q)] + max
p
(1− t)[pTβ2 + vn−1,λ(p, q)]
∴ w
1
n−1,λ(β, q) ≤ twn−1,λ(β1, q) + (1− t)twn−1,λ(β2, q)
According to Sion’s theorm [17],
w
1
n−1,λ(µ, q) = min
Y
min
β
max
Π
Φ(Π,β)
By using similar method we can find the recursive formula for the game value of
type 2 dual game. ⊓⊔
7.5 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof At stage 1 in N -stage game, player 2 knows it’s initial state q and initial
realized vector µ. Using these information it can compute it’s optimal strategy τ∗1
for stage 1 by solving the optimal problem in equation (11). Player 2 chooses it’s
stage 1 action according to the optimal strategy. If player 1 chooses some action
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for stage 1 then the stage 1 playoff of this game is,
Ep,q,σ,τ
(
µ(k1) +Gk1,l1(a1, b1)
)
=
∑
k1
µ(k1)Pr(k1) +
∑
k1,l1,a1,b1
Gk1,l1(a1, b1)Pr(k1, l1, a1, b1)
=
∑
k1
µ(k1)Pr(k1) +
∑
k1,l1,a1,b1
Gk1,l1(a1, b1)Pr(a1|k1)Pr(b1|l1)Pr(k1)Pr(l1)
=
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)µ(k) +
∑
k,l,a,b
Gk,l(a, b)Π(a, k)Pr(b|l)Pr(l)
=
∑
k,a
Π(a, k)
[
µ(k) +
∑
l,b
Gk,l(a, b)Y (b, l)q(l)
]
After stage 1, player 2 plays the optimal strategy τ∗ for N − 1 stage game
with initial parameter q+ and β∗a,b. When player 1 chooses some action and
player 2 chooses action according to its optimal strategy then payoff of the game
Γ˜ 1N−1,λ(β
∗
a,b, q
+) is,
Ep+,q+,σ,τ∗
(
β
∗
a,b(k
′) +
N−1∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
If player 2 uses the optimal strategy to take action for stage 2 : N in the N stage
game then the primal game payoff of stage 2 : N will be,
E
(
Ep+,q+,σ,τ∗
( N∑
t=2
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
|a1, b1
)
=E
(
λE
(
β
∗
a,b(k
′) +
N−1∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)− β
∗
a,b(k
′)
)
|a1, b1
)
=λ
∑
a1,b1
E
(
β
∗
a,b(k
′)) +
N−1∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)− β
∗
a,b(k
′)
)
Pr(a1, b1)
=λ
∑
a1,b1
[
E
(
β
∗
a,b(k
′) +
N−1∑
t=1
λ
t−1
Gkt,lt(at, bt)
)
− E(β∗a,b(k
′))
]
Pr(a1, b1)
=λ
∑
a1,b1
Pr(a1, b1)
[
w
1
n−1,λ(β
∗
a,b, q
+)−
∑
k′
β
∗
a,b(k
′)Pr(k′)
]
=λ
∑
a,b,k,l
Pr(a ∩ k)Pr(b|l)Pr(l)
[
w
1
n−1,λ(β
∗
a,b, q
+)−
∑
k′
β
∗
a,b(k
′)Pa,b(k, k
′)
]
=
∑
a,k
Π(a, k)λ
∑
b
y¯q,Y (b)
(
w
1
n−1,λ(βa,b, q
+
q,Y )−
∑
k′
Pa,b(k, k
′)βa,b(k
′)
)
From the maximization of the total payoff of stage 1 and 2 : N we can say, in the
worst case player 2 can achieve the game value wn,λ(µ, q). Similarly, we can prove
this for player 1. ⊓⊔
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